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Towards a re-allocation of responsibilities and a new 
division of power in the EU*
Achilleas Mitsos, former Director General of the European Commission and 
Professor of International Economic Relations at the University of the Aegean
Abstract
T he crisis has brought about a major re-allocation of responsibilities and power between and within states and institutions. The radical change in 
EU economic governance does not only refer to the involvement of supranational 
institutions and bodies in the decisions on the total national budget but also 
on the structure of national revenues and expenditures and the level of specifi c 
categories of revenue and expenditure of national budgets. In addition, the intro-
duction of all sorts of conditionalities adds a wide range of measures and policies 
to those in which the EU and the member states have co-responsibility. Further-
more, the economic crisis has brought about signifi cant changes in the institu-
tional balance of the European Union. More and more critical decisions seem to 
be taken solely as a result of intergovernmental consultations. The European 
Council is strengthened and assumes the dominant role, the European Parlia-
ment is marginalized, the Council of Ministers often becomes a simple forum for 
validation of major decisions taken in other informal bodies and the European 
Commission sees its role restricted to its executive responsibility. 
KEY-WORDS: Economic governance, EU Institutions, New intergovermentalism.
Προς μια ανακατανομή των αρμοδιοτήτων και έναν 
νέο επιμερισμό ισχύος στην Ε.Ε. 
Αχιλλέας Μητσός, πρώην Γενικός Διευθυντής της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής 
και Καθηγητής Διεθνών Οικονομικών Σχέσεων στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αιγαίου
Περίληψη
Η κρίση έχει επιφέρει σημαντική ανακατανομή αρμοδιοτήτων και ισχύος με-ταξύ και εντός κρατών και θεσμών. Η ριζική αλλαγή στην οικονομική δια-
κυβέρνηση της Ε.Ε. δεν αναφέρεται μόνο στη συμμετοχή υπερεθνικών θεσμικών 
οργάνων και οργανισμών στις αποφάσεις για τον συνολικό εθνικό προϋπολογισμό, 
αλλά και στη διάρθρωση των εθνικών εσόδων και δαπανών και στο επίπεδο των 
ειδικών κατηγοριών των εσόδων και των δαπανών των εθνικών προϋπολογισμών. 
Επιπλέον, η εισαγωγή αιρεσιμοτήτων προσθέτει ένα ευρύ φάσμα μέτρων και πο-
Περιφέρεια Τεύχος 2020 (9), 133-140
Region & Periphery Issue 2020 (9), 133-140
Ερευνητικά Σημειώματα 
Research Notes
perifereia t.9o.indd   133 15/6/2020   1:18:05 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:02:28 |
[134] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
λιτικών σε αυτές που η Ε.Ε. και τα κράτη μέλη έχουν συνυπευθυνότητα. Ακόμα, 
η οικονομική κρίση έχει επιφέρει σημαντικές αλλαγές στη θεσμική ισορροπία της 
Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Όλο και πιο κρίσιμες αποφάσεις φαίνεται να λαμβάνονται 
αποκλειστικά ως αποτέλεσμα διακυβερνητικών διαβουλεύσεων. Το Ευρωπαϊκό 
Συμβούλιο ενισχύεται και αναλαμβάνει τον κυρίαρχο ρόλο, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινο-
βούλιο περιθωριοποιείται, το Συμβούλιο Των Υπουργών γίνεται συχνά ένα απλό 
φόρουμ για την επικύρωση των σημαντικών αποφάσεων που λαμβάνονται σε άλλα 
άτυπα όργανα και η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή βλέπει τον ρόλο της να περιορίζεται 
στις εκτελεστικές της αρμοδιότητες.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Οικονομική διακυβέρνηση, Θεσμοί της Ε.Ε., Νέος διακυβερ-
νητισμός.
1. In addition to unprecedented and multiple redistri-
bution of income, the crisis has brought about a major 
re-allocation of responsibilities and power between and 
within states and institutions
T he crisis led to a large transnational redistribution of income and wealth. This uneven and asymmetric impact has reinforced the already signifi cant 
imbalances between the EU center and the countries of the periphery, with the 
South as the big loser. The major victim of this redistribution, Greece, in terms of 
GDP per capita, ranked 15th among the 28 member states in 2008 (with 93% of 
the EU average) and, ten years later, with 67% of the average, ranked 25th, with 
only the last three acceding countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, to follow.
Perhaps less prominent, but equally if not more impressive, is the redis-
tribution of income and wealth within each country. In many member states, 
including Greece, large class, occupational, interregional and intergenerational 
redistributions are taking place and there is a clear deterioration in income and 
wealth inequality indicators.
But beyond that, the institutional balance on which the European Union 
rests is being disrupted by major long-term consequences and new balances are 
sought in the division of responsibilities and power between member states and 
the EU, among the institutions that make up the EU, as well as between the 
methods of decision-making and the two functions, transnational and suprana-
tional, which have always co-existed in the process of European integration.
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2. New powers are transferred to the EU “by stealth”, 
without altering the Treaties
T he neofunctionalist account describes the process of integration as an incre-mental process which is driven by the demands of interest groups for mar-
ket integration and supranational institutions responding to these demands, fol-
lowing the functional logic which characterizes highly interdependent economies 
and linkages between different policy areas (Vilpišauskas 2013, p. 364). This 
process, ‘integration by stealth’ according to Majone (2005), had reached its limit 
when the next step was to transfer national sovereignty on the particularly sen-
sitive area of  redistribution and the harmonization of social policy through fi scal 
policy (Habermas 2015). And yet, with the need for ‘result-based legitimacy’, 
even this ‘red line’ now seems to be overrun (Chalmers, et al. 2016). The crisis 
has resulted to a new wave of “legislation through the back door”.
The radical change in EU economic governance, with the adoption of the 
“European Semester” and all the procedures for more effective coordination 
of member states’ fi nancial and budgetary plans, does not only refer to the in-
volvement of supranational institutions and bodies in the decisions on the total 
national budget and the relationship between revenues and expenditures. The 
need to prevent future toxic problems for all countries leads to a direct EU in-
volvement, in practice a co-decision of EU and the member states, on the struc-
ture of national revenues and expenditures and the level of specifi c categories of 
revenue and expenditure of national budgets. 
EU member states (and not just the countries under surveillance, not even 
only the eurozone ones) delegate national competence to areas for which the 
Treaty does not provide for harmonization. The level of pensions and more gen-
erally the insurance and pension policy, the extent of tax burdens and the ef-
fi ciency of the national tax system are classic examples in this regard. Through 
the surveillance process, the EU intervenes and co-determines with each country 
not only the annual budget, but also policies that would otherwise remain almost 
completely in the hands of governments.
In addition, the introduction of all sorts of conditionalities add a wide range 
of measures and policies to those in which EU and the member states have co-
responsibility. Input and output conditionalities are introduced in the structur-
al funds, the use of macro-conditionalities is generalised and, according to the 
Commission’s proposal for the future budget, a new, “political” conditionality 
would be introduced, linking participation of a member State in the budget with 
the acceptance of the rule of law and EU values. In some cases, this extension 
of the areas of co-responsibility goes beyond the areas defi ned by the Treaty as 
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areas of “shared competence”1 and, as a result, many aspects of social or educa-
tion policy or even the way justice is delivered, are infl uenced by this new form 
of economic governance. 
The advantage EU gets from this generalized use of conditionalities, is that 
the effectiveness of Community goals and policies may signifi cantly increase, 
turning “soft”, non-binding, decisions into “hard” ones. The threat, for exam-
ple, that failure to implement a specifi c pension reform will cut off fi nancial aid 
makes the choice of the pension system an EU policy, while previously the EU 
could only express wishes in this regard. It should be noted that the establish-
ment of conditionality has always been a classic consequence when it comes to 
external assistance from organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
or the World Bank, but its use within the EU is a relatively new phenomenon2. 
The prevailing perception was that the establishment of conditionalities was a 
practice of international organizations, but was not appropriate for the imple-
mentation of Community policy. After all, it is diffi cult to imagine the use of such 
conditionalities within a single state, or a “quasi state”.
What needs to be emphasized is that this intrusion of EU in new areas 
and policies is not politically or ideologically neutral. What is strengthened is 
the role of the EU in promoting more «liberal», market creating policies vis-à-
vis more «interventionist» policies (industrial, research, regional development, 
etc.). The dominant position of the economy in relation to the social dimension 
is exacerbated.
3. The economic crisis has brought about signifi cant 
changes in the institutional balance of the European 
Union 
T he fi nancial and economic crisis has brought about signifi cant changes in the institutional balance of the European Union. This institutional re-bal-
ancing of recent years has been the result of the crisis, its expression and the 
cause of new imbalances, even if specifi c institutional arrangements of the Trea-
ty of Lisbon, coupled with a substantial shift in the overall approach on the part 
of Germany,3 a federalism-friendly member-state, have provided the ground for 
this new institutional balance. 
The European Council is the big winner. It is precisely because of the partic-
ular political weight of the crisis and the widespread perception of high risk, that 
the European Council’s leadership is considered indispensable and irreplace-
able. As Bressanelli and Chelotti (2016, p. 515) write: “indeed, the European 
Council is perfectly located within the institutional architecture to determine 
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and/or modify the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAs) of the 
negotiating parties”.
The number of European Council meetings has almost tripled during the 
crisis (Fabbrini and Puetter 2016, p. 489), but with the main characteristic that 
fundamental decisions are taken essentially outside the European Council, by 
one country, or, at best, by a group of countries. Never before has the concept of 
‘directoire’ been so obvious. Too often, Germany and its ‘allies’, or, sometimes, 
Germany together with France, made all substantive decisions. In practice, for-
mally, it was at the European Council that all major decisions to deal with the 
crisis were taken (after, often diffi cult, intra-governmental negotiations were 
mediated in some countries, such as in Germany, between the Chancellor and 
the Minister of Finance) and the ECFIN Council, and in particular the “infor-
mal” Eurogroup of eurozone fi nance ministers, were simply invited to implement 
them,4 serving in reality only as a forum for communication and enforcement of 
those decisions, while the Commission’s role was reduced to that of the secre-
tariat, and the European Parliament was completely absent. 
The European Council is strengthened and assumes the dominant role, the 
European Parliament is marginalized, the Council of Ministers often becomes 
a simple forum for validation of major decisions taken in other informal bodies 
and the European Commission sees its role confi ned to the implementation of 
decisions. The Commission is often referred to as the “big loser” of the new insti-
tutional balance (Laffan 2016: 919), while perhaps the “major transformation” of 
its role should be emphasized. Finally, another institution, a genuine “federal” 
one, the European Central Bank, sees its position being upgraded, even though 
it did so by reinterpreting the rules without admitting to this publicly – in other 
words, “by stealth”, (Laffan 2016:919).
4. Towards a “new intergovernmentalism”
T he dominance of the European Council caused a serious blow to the “Community method”, the central elements of which have always been the 
following: (a) The Commission has the exclusive right of (legislative) initiative, (b) 
the fi nal decision is taken jointly by Parliament and the Council (of Ministers), by 
a simple majority of members of Parliament and a qualifi ed majority of member 
states; and (c) the implementation of any decisions is left to the Commission 
(often, as in the Structural Funds in a ‘partnership’ with the member states).
The European Council, precisely because it expresses the leadership of the 
governments of the member states, that is to say, the people in charge of the major 
decisions, now functions as “deus ex machina”, as opposed to the necessarily 
perifereia t.9o.indd   137 15/6/2020   1:18:05 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:02:28 |
[138] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
complex and time-consuming classical Community method (Bertoncini and 
Kreilinger 2012). In practice, not only at the European Council, but also at 
the Council of Ministers, the principle of unanimity reverts to major decisions, 
thereby forcing the European Parliament to marginalization.
This “new intergovernmentalism”5 marks a paradox. While the Lisbon 
Treaty increases the number of policy areas where decisions are taken by the 
‘Community method’, in practice the European Union has become no more a 
‘federation’. On the contrary, more and more critical decisions seem to be taken 
solely as a result of intergovernmental consultations, at least on major issues, 
with Parliament complaining about returning to an exclusively advisory role 
and with the Commission restricted to its executive responsibility. 
In the long run, the new institutional equilibrium may prove to be the 
most signifi cant impact of the crisis on the European integration process. As 
emphasized by Dawson (2015), the crisis has challenged existing forms of ac-
countability. The intergovernmental and Community methods are not only de-
scriptive categories but contain specifi c structures of democratic accountability. 
The intergovernmental method is based on democratic legitimization through 
national parliaments, the Community through mainly the European Parlia-
ment. On the contrary, post-crisis economic governance tends to move to a ‘grey 
zone’. Jürgen Habermas’ “executive federalism” (Habermas 2015, see also Kon-
stantinidis-Treurniert 2018, p. 138) seems to be prevalent, while “democratic 
federalism”, namely the transformation of the European project into a process 
increasingly driven by the people, not the technocratic elites, fades away. Per-
haps most importantly, this new institutional equilibrium does not represent a 
simple parenthesis in times of crisis, but a new, permanent distribution of roles 
and responsibilities.
Notes
* Many of the thoughts contained in this article are also included in A. Mitsos, 
in collaboration with D. Katsikas, EU Fiscal Policy. Towards “fi scal union”? 
ELIAMEP for the Bank of Greece, forthcoming. 
1. It is recalled that, while for most policy areas the Treaty provides for “multi-
level governance” (“shared competence”), there remain areas for which either 
the Union or member states maintain exclusive competence. The latter in-
clude e.g. educational policy.
2. Concerning the fi nancing of the European Structural and Investment Funds it is recalled 
that the original conditionalities were reserved exclusively for the Cohesion Fund, but 
since 2014 they are extended to other Funds (Regional, Social, etc.).
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3. Chancellor A. Merkel, already in 2010 in her speech at Bruges 2010 (Merkel 2010), has 
argued for the need, at least in part, to abandon the ‘Community method’ and to adopt the 
‘Union method’, essentially that method which member states would consider every time 
to be the most appropriate.
4. The establishment of the Eurogroup is one of the key institutional reforms (Von Ordarza 
2013), with a permanent presidency and, although introduced into the Treaty by Protocol 
14 as an “informal” body, it has, in practice, direct implementing powers. On the legal 
nature of the Eurogroup, see Καραγκούνης and Ράντου 2013.
5. Οn ‘new intergovernmentalism’, see in particular Bressanelli and Chelotti (2015), Bick-
eton, Hodson and Puetter (2015), Dawson (2015), as well as Dehouse (2016) and other 
articles in the related issue 38: 5 of the Journal of European Integration, 2016, as well as 
Buti and Krobath (2019).
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